Shooting down USA-193: A $100 million shot to be followed by even greater political costs

By Victoria Samson, CDI Research Analyst
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The Feb. 20, 2008 shoot-down of the errant spy satellite by the Navy’s ballistic missile defense system has been used by program officials and missile defense supporters to promote the system’s utility. The differences between the shoot-down of a satellite and the intercept of an attacking missile are so great that the most lasting effects of this shoot-down will not be on the technological prowess demonstrated but the political ramifications of the shot.

As stated earlier, this satellite intercept was significantly different from earlier SM-3 missile defense test shots. To begin, the system itself was reconfigured for this new objective. Three of the SM-3s were pulled aside for this mission, as well as three Aegis ships. The missiles had their third stages disabled or removed, the guidance systems were changed, and the seeker software was modified. The entire event has been calculated to have cost around $100 million.

The changes to the SM-3s were done in acknowledgement that the target was going to be a lot different than would any enemy warhead.

The National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO)’s satellite that was deorbiting beyond the United States’ control, the USA-193, was launched in December 2006 and almost immediately failed to respond to ground control. The United States was unable to communicate with it and thus unable to control it – hence the purported concern about its coming down with a full tank of hydrazine (the given reason for the shoot-down).

In any case, the satellite had a vastly different infrared signature than the SM-3’s normal targets. The Pentagon also waited for the sun to warm up USA-193 so that it would have a larger infrared signature.

The software was modified in an effort to tell the SM-3s what to look for. In tests, missile defense systems are given information prior to their intercepts as to the details of their targets: what they will look like, how they will behave, where they will be at certain times, etc. The missile defense interceptor is placed where it pretty much has to just open its eyes and look in a pre-specified area for a pre-specified target. In this case, the Pentagon did the same thing, telling the SM-3 where to expect its target and what it would look like. This target was several times larger than the usual warheads that the SM-3 has aimed for in previous intercept attempts and the closing speed faster than what the SM-3 had prior experienced.

This intercept was done at an altitude of 150 miles, instead of the roughly 100 miles altitude that the SM-3 has made intercepts before, and it was following a highly predictable and well-known orbit. In addition, extra radar and telescope systems, not available for missile defense, were trained on the satellite to be sure its path was known precisely. This has not been the case during conflict. For example, in the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. missile defense systems had a terrible time tracking Iraq’s Scuds because the latter’s shoddy composition meant they meandered in-flight and confused missile defense discrimination systems. USA-193 was circling the globe 16 times a day and thus the Pentagon was able to pick and choose where it would attempt the intercept that any debris created would quickly burn up.

The most crucial way in which this satellite shoot-down mimics earlier missile defense tests is the way in which the Pentagon was able to mold the shoot-down attempt so that an intercept would be successful. While this is understandable early in the development process of a weapons system, it means that what you have is a testing environment that does not represent an operationally realistic circumstance. In an age where the Pentagon pushes for “test as you fly” – that is, test your systems in situations similar to how they will be used – this is not the case here. Besides the information given to the system ahead of time, something that an enemy missile probably would not be kind enough to do, the entire shoot-down attempt was controlled by the Pentagon. This means that as much as supporters would like, these recent events cannot be taken to mean that missile defense has been validated and can work anytime, anywhere.

The weather was a consideration for the missile defense system. According to Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they were thinking about postponing the intercept attempt from Feb. 20 as planned because there were choppy seas in the region that the Aegis ships were posted. But as the planned intercept attempt time approached, the seas calmed, and Cartwright said, “[W]e had a good weather window, but what we were facing is, there is a low moving into the area, that would be in the area for the next four or five days. So we decided that we would proceed last night.” In wartime circumstances, an enemy launching a missile attack might not be as cooperative as to wait until the seas were less rough.

Missile defense supporters and Pentagon officials, despite all the differences between this shoot-down and how the SM-3 is normally configured for testing purposes, have been using the downing of USA-193 as general validation for missile defense technologies. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sums up much of this attitude with, “The question of whether this capability works has been settled…The question is against what kind of threat, how large a threat, how sophisticated a threat.” This is not true. Missile defense has not proven itself to work under realistically stressful situations.

He would be better informed as to what missile defense can do if he were to pay attention to his own officials. During a press conference held by Cartwright the day after USA-193 was shot down, the following Q&A ensued:

Q: Does the whole episode then add to the knowledge that could be used or applied to missile defense at all?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Other than netting the sensors together, which is what we use for missile defense, not really. I mean, it doesn't cross over.

Since three SM-3s were prepared for the shoot-down, it would imply that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) thought that there was a pretty good chance the first SM-3 would miss.

And to say that all that remains is the who/what/where of the threat is to say that practically all of the challenges remain to be dealt with. This shoot-down of USA-193 is not technologically a huge step forward for missile defense: it does not indicate how it can handle countermeasures, something the Aegis BMD system has never tested against. Yet if the MDA continues to count on the next generation of the SM-3 to handle long-range ballistic missiles (instead of the short- and medium-range ones that it is designed for), this will be a condition it will run into eventually.

Politically, however, the consequences from this shoot-down will be felt long after the last bits of debris have burnt up in the atmosphere. In the short-run, this will probably ensure that the Aegis BMD system gets the full amount of funding it has requested for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009: $1.2 billion (with the goal of spending $5.2 billion on it through FY 13).

While this was portrayed as a one-time, never-to-be-repeated deal by the United States, in the end, our allies and enemies will never know which version of the Aegis BMD system we’ve got deployed. Is it in its missile defense or ASAT mode? While the Pentagon does claim that it is undoing the changes to the SM-3, these software modifications could be put back in at any time. The SM-3, modified or not, theoretically can reach satellites in Low Earth Orbit (the altitude it can reach depends on how far down-range its target is).

This may give further pause to those who have been alarmed at the United States’ plans to extend its missile defense to sites in Europe. According to U.S. Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security John Rood, who went to speak with Russian officials to alleviate their concerns after the shoot-down, “This was and is not an attempt to develop a weapon. The United States has no intention to engage in an arms race on earth, or in space.” Put ourselves in other countries’ shoes. Would we take this statement at face value and believe it, or would we use this as a justification for working on our own systems to shoot down satellites?

This use of the SM-3 was not the first time MDA has been tangled up in the debate over the weaponization of space. Previous budget requests by the Bush administration have included a line for a Space Test Bed that would over the long run have space-based interceptors. This highly controversial program was zeroed out during the congressional deliberations over the FY 08 budget debate due to concerns about it weaponizing space. Perhaps arms control advocates were watching the wrong program.