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INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL: Open Letter

Attn: Foreign Policy; Energy; Defense; and Intelligence Aides

Dear Member of Congress,

We, the undersigned group of independent experts and organizations with substantial experience in the field of international security respectfully urge you to:

• Reject the proposed U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation (a.k.a. “123”) agreement in its current form;
• Actively support measures that would help address the numerous flaws and ambiguities in this proposal; and
• Resist overtures to rush toward a vote without carefully considering the far-reaching nuclear nonproliferation and security implications of this unprecedented and complex arrangement.

While we support expanded trade and ties between the United States and India, the energy, trade, and nonproliferation advantages of the proposal are vastly overstated by its proponents and the potential damage to the global nonproliferation system would be severe. Contrary to assertions by the Administration, the proposal would not bring India sufficiently into conformance with nonproliferation behavior expected of responsible nuclear-armed states.

As mandated by the 2006 Henry J. Hyde Act, the Administration obtained an India-specific waiver from longstanding Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines restricting trade with states, such as India, that are not members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and do not allow comprehensive safeguards. Paradoxically, the Administration on Sept. 6 jammed through the NSG a waiver that does not incorporate the same common sense restrictions and conditions on nuclear trade with India that are required for U.S. nuclear trade with India. The Hyde Act mandates a ban on the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technologies to Indian national facilities (unless they are part of a safeguarded bilateral or multilateral research program) and a requirement to cut off nuclear trade if India resumes nuclear testing.

Furthermore, the 123 agreement delivered to Congress on Sept. 10 contains ambiguous wording, loopholes, and inconsistencies with the Hyde Act. Before Congress acts on the agreement, it is essential that Congress ensure that U.S. and Indian officials resolve their differences on key issues including safeguards and the possible termination of the agreement in the event that India resumes nuclear testing.

U.S. firms will not be at a disadvantage due to any delay in the consideration of the 123 agreement because the Indian government has stated publicly that other bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements will not be implemented until the U.S. Congress approves this agreement. In addition, no supplier state can engage in nuclear trade with India until such time as it signs its new IAEA-Indian safeguards agreement. Furthermore, U.S. nuclear vendors will not be in a position to engage in nuclear trade with India until such time as India ratifies the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the convention enters into force.