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INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL: Background

India Is Still Not in the Nonproliferation Mainstream:

The arrangement would give India rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that are more favorable than even for countries that are in good standing under the NPT.

• The deal fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of the NPT member states.
• Unlike 179 other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
• As one of only three states never to have signed the NPT, it has not made a legally-binding commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament.
• It creates a dangerous distinction between "good" proliferators and "bad" proliferators and sends out misleading signals to the international community with regard to NPT norms.
• It will make the task of winning international support to contain and constrain the nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, and potential proliferators more difficult.

The Agreement Would Indirectly Assist India’s Nuclear Weapons Program:

Foreign supplies of nuclear fuel to India’s civil nuclear sector will reduce or eliminate India’s need to sacrifice electricity production to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

• This would enable India to increase the rate of fissile material production for bombs and violate the spirit if not the letter of Article I of the NPT.
• This situation will likely worsen nuclear arms competition in Asia.
• There is no provision in the 123 agreement or the Indian-IAEA safeguards agreement that prohibits India from removing heavy water from its safeguarded “civilian” reactors and extracting tritium, which can be used as boost gas for India’s nuclear warheads.

Safeguards on Additional Reactors Provide Little Nonproliferation Value:

The chief nonproliferation benefit cited by the Bush Administration is that India would put a number of reactors and facilities under IAEA safeguards. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few additional “civilian” reactors provides no serious nonproliferation benefits and will cost the underfunded IAEA tens of million of dollars extra to implement.

Disagreement Regarding the Permanence of Safeguards:

Indian officials have publicly suggested they may withdraw from the safeguards agreement if fuel supplies are interrupted, even if it is due to a nuclear test. An official acknowledgment by the Government of India of the U.S. and IAEA interpretation is necessary to ensure there is no misunderstanding and should not be a problem if the safeguards agreement is in order.

A Declaration of Facilities to Be Safeguarded Has Not Been Filed with the IAEA:

There is no guarantee that India will place under safeguards the list of civil facilities it identified in its March 6, 2006 statement to the Indian parliament.

• Section 104 of the Hyde Act requires that the President determine, before he submits the proposed U.S.-Indian peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress, that India, “has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.”
• The Hyde Act also requires that the President include with his determination an analysis and a copy of “the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India’s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards.”
• To date, India has not filed a declaration of facilities that will be subject to the safeguards agreement. In fact, India's safeguards agreement (Section II A. para 13) says:

  "Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions conducive to accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner."

Enrichment and Reprocessing Issues:

• The State Department has informed Congress that as a matter of policy the United States does not intend to transfer such technologies. Congress should transform this U.S. policy into law.
• The State Department also claims that no NSG participating government intends to transfer such technologies to India. However, until such time as the NSG adopts new guidelines barring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to non-NPT members, other states may engage in such trade with India.
• Under the NSG waiver, other countries may continue trading with India and India asserts that under the U.S.-Indian 123 agreement, the United States and other suppliers should provide fuel supplies even it resumes testing.
• Congress must clarify that if India resumes nuclear testing, the United States will terminate bilateral nuclear trade, and immediately convene an emergency NSG meeting to seek the termination of all NSG trade with India.

India’s Nonproliferation Record Is Not “Impeccable:”

India has apparently relied upon a secret program to outfit its uranium enrichment program and circumvent other countries’ export control efforts. These procurement practices create the potential for leakage of sensitive nuclear technology and know-how and should be fully scrutinized by the relevant congressional committees.

India and Iran:

In addition, at a time when the United States and many in Congress are seeking to further sanction Iran to persuade it to come clean on its past, secret nuclear activities and halt its uranium enrichment, India has joined in NAM statements supporting Iran’s nuclear program and is a major supplier of refined petroleum products for Tehran. Furthermore, shortly after the House vote on the Hyde Act in 2006, the State Department belatedly reported that Indian entities had sold sensitive missile technologies to Iran in violation of U.S. export control laws.