Iran must be included in peace talks
Iran Page

TRITA PARSI
National Iranian American Council.
December 12, 2007

In light of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran released last
week, the Bush administration's choice to exclude Iran from the
Annapolis meeting in late November looks all the more foolhardy.

But the sole country from the region not to be invited to the summit
was also the main reason why Washington put on the high-profile
meeting to begin with.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dismissed any notion that
Annapolis was more about isolating Iran than finding peace between
Israelis and Palestinians. Yet, she said, the perceived threat from
Iran provided the "regional context" of the conference - one in which
the United States hoped that the Arabs would feel more compelled to
make a deal with Israel, any deal, in order to push back Shia Iran.

This approach has been tried before and has failed. Attempting to
forge peace between Israel and the Arabs while seeking new regional
arrangements by excluding Iran is self-defeating. Excluding Iran from
regional diplomacy fuels rather than diminishes Tehran's propensity to
act the spoiler. Instead, Washington should use the carrot of Iranian
inclusion to win much-needed behavioral changes from Tehran.

When the first George Bush administration organized the Madrid summit
16 years ago, Washington invited virtually every nation in the region
with one exception: Iran. America was understandably confident at the
time. It had just won the Cold War, and its United Nations-mandated
coalition had handsomely defeated Saddam Hussein's army.

Indeed, Madrid was a celebration of America's new position as the sole
superpower. The circumstances for peacemaking could not have been better.

In Tehran, the mood was somber. The Iranians believed they had played
a helpful role during the Persian Gulf War by permitting the United
States to use Iranian airspace and by resisting the temptation to fuel
the Shia uprising in southern Iraq.

Now, Tehran hoped, Washington would reciprocate by bringing Iran in
from the cold and inviting it to the Spanish capital. Madrid was,
after all, not just about the Israelis and Palestinians, but the
defining summit for forming the new Middle East order - one in which
Tehran hoped to play a role commensurate with its geopolitical weight.

Tehran reacted bitterly to Washington's snub. Some Iranian officials
pointed to Iran's participation in the Bonn, Germany, conference of
2001 on Afghanistan as an indication of the constructive role Iran
could play when included. "We accepted a role in the Bonn conference
on Afghanistan, and we wanted to participate in Madrid as well," an
adviser to former President Mohammad Khatami explained.

The non-invitation and the ensuing peace process - which Tehran saw as
an effort to create a new Middle East order based on Iran's exclusion
- weakened Iran's pragmatists and pushed Tehran toward more disruptive
policies. If inclusion wasn't in the cards, the policy of excluding
Iran should be made as costly as possible to the United States, Tehran
reasoned.

Through asymmetric warfare, despite its weakness and America's
military and political strength, Tehran contributed to the undoing of
the peace process and the effort to lock in an anti-Iranian regional
order.

Pursuing the same failed strategy once more indicates the triumph of
hope over reason. What's more, the tables have now turned: Tehran is
riding high, while the United States finds itself in a debacle in
Iraq. What failed under the best of circumstances is unlikely to
succeed under much less generous conditions.

The cost of additional policy failures in the Middle East has grown
exponentially, and there are a few realities Washington can no longer
afford to ignore. First, a stable regional order cannot be achieved
unless there is buy-in from regional powerhouses. Excluding states
from regional diplomacy only provides them with incentives to
undermine our efforts.

Second, Iran in particular must be included. Whether we like it or
not, Iran is an undeniable regional power, and sustainable stability
cannot be achieved without Tehran's inclusion.

Third, inclusion will work to America's advantage. While Tehran can
make it costly for the United States to exclude it from regional
decision-making, Iran cannot achieve its key objective - political
inclusion - without American acceptance. This provides Washington with
tremendous leverage that it thus far has failed to recognize. The
United States can attain significant Iranian behavioral changes - on
the nuclear front, Iraq, terrorism and Israel - through the carrot of
inclusion that neither sanctions nor threats of war have achieved.

With the intelligence estimate pulling the rug from under the feet of
the administration and its policy to confront Iran, it's now all the
more important that the White House get serious about diplomacy and
use its winning card in direct negotiations with Tehran.

Trita Parsi is the author of "Treacherous Alliance: The Secret
Dealings of Israel, Iran and the U.S." and president of the National
Iranian American Council.