Watching Lebanon
by Seymour Hersh
The New Yorker
August
21 2006
In the days after
Hezbollah crossed from Lebanon into Israel, on July 12th, to kidnap
two soldiers, triggering an Israeli air attack on Lebanon and a full-scale
war, the Bush Administration seemed strangely passive. "It's a
moment of clarification," President George W. Bush said at the
G-8 summit, in St. Petersburg, on July 16th. "It's now become clear
why we don't have peace in the Middle East." He described the relationship
between Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran and Syria as one of the
"root causes of instability," and subsequently said that it
was up to those countries to end the crisis. Two days later, despite
calls from several governments for the United States to take the lead
in negotiations to end the fighting, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice said that a ceasefire should be put off until "the conditions
are conducive."
The Bush Administration,
however, was closely involved in the planning of Israel's retaliatory
attacks. President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney were convinced,
current and former intelligence and diplomatic officials told me, that
a successful Israeli Air Force bombing campaign against Hezbollah's
heavily fortified underground-missile and command-and-control complexes
in Lebanon could ease Israel's security concerns and also serve as a
prelude to a potential American preëmptive attack to destroy Iran's
nuclear installations, some of which are also buried deep underground.
Israeli military
and intelligence experts I spoke to emphasized that the country's immediate
security issues were reason enough to confront Hezbollah, regardless
of what the Bush Administration wanted. Shabtai Shavit, a national-security
adviser to the Knesset who headed the Mossad, Israel's foreign-intelligence
service, from 1989 to 1996, told me, "We do what we think is best
for us, and if it happens to meet America's requirements, that's just
part of a relationship between two friends. Hezbollah is armed to the
teeth and trained in the most advanced technology of guerrilla warfare.
It was just a matter of time. We had to address it."
Hezbollah is seen
by Israelis as a profound threat - a terrorist organization, operating
on their border, with a military arsenal that, with help from Iran and
Syria, has grown stronger since the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon
ended, in 2000. Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has said
he does not believe that Israel is a "legal state." Israeli
intelligence estimated at the outset of the air war that Hezbollah had
roughly five hundred medium-range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets and a few
dozen long-range Zelzal rockets; the Zelzals, with a range of about
two hundred kilometres, could reach Tel Aviv. (One rocket hit Haifa
the day after the kidnappings.) It also has more than twelve thousand
shorter-range rockets. Since the conflict began, more than three thousand
of these have been fired at Israel.
According to a
Middle East expert with knowledge of the current thinking of both the
Israeli and the U.S. governments, Israel had devised a plan for attacking
Hezbollah - and shared it with Bush Administration officials - well
before the July 12th kidnappings. "It's not that the Israelis had
a trap that Hezbollah walked into," he said, "but there was
a strong feeling in the White House that sooner or later the Israelis
were going to do it."
The Middle East
expert said that the Administration had several reasons for supporting
the Israeli bombing campaign. Within the State Department, it was seen
as a way to strengthen the Lebanese government so that it could assert
its authority over the south of the country, much of which is controlled
by Hezbollah. He went on, "The White House was more focussed on
stripping Hezbollah of its missiles, because, if there was to be a military
option against Iran's nuclear facilities, it had to get rid of the weapons
that Hezbollah could use in a potential retaliation at Israel. Bush
wanted both. Bush was going after Iran, as part of the Axis of Evil,
and its nuclear sites, and he was interested in going after Hezbollah
as part of his interest in democratization, with Lebanon as one of the
crown jewels of Middle East democracy."
Administration
officials denied that they knew of Israel's plan for the air war. The
White House did not respond to a detailed list of questions. In response
to a separate request, a National Security Council spokesman said, "Prior
to Hezbollah's attack on Israel, the Israeli government gave no official
in Washington any reason to believe that Israel was planning to attack.
Even after the July 12th attack, we did not know what the Israeli plans
were." A Pentagon spokesman said, "The United States government
remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran's
clandestine nuclear weapons program," and denied the story, as
did a State Department spokesman.
The United States
and Israel have shared intelligence and enjoyed close military coöperation
for decades, but early this spring, according to a former senior intelligence
official, high-level planners from the U.S. Air Force - under pressure
from the White House to develop a war plan for a decisive strike against
Iran's nuclear facilities - began consulting with their counterparts
in the Israeli Air Force.
"The big question
for our Air Force was how to hit a series of hard targets in Iran successfully,"
the former senior intelligence official said. "Who is the closest
ally of the U.S. Air Force in its planning? It's not Congo - it's Israel.
Everybody knows that Iranian engineers have been advising Hezbollah
on tunnels and underground gun emplacements. And so the Air Force went
to the Israelis with some new tactics and said to them, 'Let's concentrate
on the bombing and share what we have on Iran and what you have on Lebanon.'
" The discussions reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he said.
"The Israelis
told us it would be a cheap war with many benefits," a U.S. government
consultant with close ties to Israel said. "Why oppose it? We'll
be able to hunt down and bomb missiles, tunnels, and bunkers from the
air. It would be a demo for Iran."
A Pentagon consultant
said that the Bush White House "has been agitating for some time
to find a reason for a preëmptive blow against Hezbollah."
He added, "It was our intent to have Hezbollah diminished, and
now we have someone else doing it." (As this article went to press,
the United Nations Security Council passed a ceasefire resolution, although
it was unclear if it would change the situation on the ground.)
According to Richard
Armitage, who served as Deputy Secretary of State in Bush's first term
- and who, in 2002, said that Hezbollah "may be the A team of terrorists"
- Israel's campaign in Lebanon, which has faced unexpected difficulties
and widespread criticism, may, in the end, serve as a warning to the
White House about Iran. "If the most dominant military force in
the region - the Israel Defense Forces - can't pacify a country like
Lebanon, with a population of four million, you should think carefully
about taking that template to Iran, with strategic depth and a population
of seventy million," Armitage said. "The only thing that the
bombing has achieved so far is to unite the population against the Israelis."
Several current
and former officials involved in the Middle East told me that Israel
viewed the soldiers' kidnapping as the opportune moment to begin its
planned military campaign against Hezbollah. "Hezbollah, like clockwork,
was instigating something small every month or two," the U.S. government
consultant with ties to Israel said. Two weeks earlier, in late June,
members of Hamas, the Palestinian group, had tunnelled under the barrier
separating southern Gaza from Israel and captured an Israeli soldier.
Hamas also had lobbed a series of rockets at Israeli towns near the
border with Gaza. In response, Israel had initiated an extensive bombing
campaign and reoccupied parts of Gaza.
The Pentagon consultant
noted that there had also been cross-border incidents involving Israel
and Hezbollah, in both directions, for some time. "They've been
sniping at each other," he said. "Either side could have pointed
to some incident and said 'We have to go to war with these guys' - because
they were already at war."
David Siegel, the
spokesman at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, said that the Israeli
Air Force had not been seeking a reason to attack Hezbollah. "We
did not plan the campaign. That decision was forced on us." There
were ongoing alerts that Hezbollah "was pressing to go on the attack,"
Siegel said. "Hezbollah attacks every two or three months,"
but the kidnapping of the soldiers raised the stakes.
In interviews,
several Israeli academics, journalists, and retired military and intelligence
officers all made one point: they believed that the Israeli leadership,
and not Washington, had decided that it would go to war with Hezbollah.
Opinion polls showed that a broad spectrum of Israelis supported that
choice. "The neocons in Washington may be happy, but Israel did
not need to be pushed, because Israel has been wanting to get rid of
Hezbollah," Yossi Melman, a journalist for the newspaper Ha'aretz,
who has written several books about the Israeli intelligence community,
said. "By provoking Israel, Hezbollah provided that opportunity."
"We were facing
a dilemma," an Israeli official said. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
"had to decide whether to go for a local response, which we always
do, or for a comprehensive response - to really take on Hezbollah once
and for all." Olmert made his decision, the official said, only
after a series of Israeli rescue efforts failed.
The U.S. government
consultant with close ties to Israel told me, however, that, from Israel's
perspective, the decision to take strong action had become inevitable
weeks earlier, after the Israeli Army's signals intelligence group,
known as Unit 8200, picked up bellicose intercepts in late spring and
early summer, involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and Khaled Meshal, the Hamas
leader now living in Damascus.
One intercept was
of a meeting in late May of the Hamas political and military leadership,
with Meshal participating by telephone. "Hamas believed the call
from Damascus was scrambled, but Israel had broken the code," the
consultant said. For almost a year before its victory in the Palestinian
elections in January, Hamas had curtailed its terrorist activities.
In the late May intercepted conversation, the consultant told me, the
Hamas leadership said that "they got no benefit from it, and were
losing standing among the Palestinian population." The conclusion,
he said, was " 'Let's go back into the terror business and then
try and wrestle concessions from the Israeli government.' " The
consultant told me that the U.S. and Israel agreed that if the Hamas
leadership did so, and if Nasrallah backed them up, there should be
"a full-scale response." In the next several weeks, when Hamas
began digging the tunnel into Israel, the consultant said, Unit 8200
"picked up signals intelligence involving Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah,
saying, in essence, that they wanted Hezbollah to 'warm up' the north."
In one intercept, the consultant said, Nasrallah referred to Olmert
and Defense Minister Amir Peretz "as seeming to be weak,"
in comparison with the former Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud
Barak, who had extensive military experience, and said "he thought
Israel would respond in a small-scale, local way, as they had in the
past."
Earlier this summer,
before the Hezbollah kidnappings, the U.S. government consultant said,
several Israeli officials visited Washington, separately, "to get
a green light for the bombing operation and to find out how much the
United States would bear." The consultant added, "Israel began
with Cheney. It wanted to be sure that it had his support and the support
of his office and the Middle East desk of the National Security Council."
After that, "persuading Bush was never a problem, and Condi Rice
was on board," the consultant said.
The initial plan,
as outlined by the Israelis, called for a major bombing campaign in
response to the next Hezbollah provocation, according to the Middle
East expert with knowledge of U.S. and Israeli thinking. Israel believed
that, by targeting Lebanon's infrastructure, including highways, fuel
depots, and even the civilian runways at the main Beirut airport, it
could persuade Lebanon's large Christian and Sunni populations to turn
against Hezbollah, according to the former senior intelligence official.
The airport, highways, and bridges, among other things, have been hit
in the bombing campaign. The Israeli Air Force had flown almost nine
thousand missions as of last week. (David Siegel, the Israeli spokesman,
said that Israel had targeted only sites connected to Hezbollah; the
bombing of bridges and roads was meant to prevent the transport of weapons.)
The Israeli plan,
according to the former senior intelligence official, was "the
mirror image of what the United States has been planning for Iran."
(The initial U.S. Air Force proposals for an air attack to destroy Iran's
nuclear capacity, which included the option of intense bombing of civilian
infrastructure targets inside Iran, have been resisted by the top leadership
of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, according to current and
former officials. They argue that the Air Force plan will not work and
will inevitably lead, as in the Israeli war with Hezbollah, to the insertion
of troops on the ground.)
Uzi Arad, who served
for more than two decades in the Mossad, told me that to the best of
his knowledge the contacts between the Israeli and U.S. governments
were routine, and that, "in all my meetings and conversations with
government officials, never once did I hear anyone refer to prior coördination
with the United States." He was troubled by one issue - the speed
with which the Olmert government went to war. "For the life of
me, I've never seen a decision to go to war taken so speedily,"
he said. "We usually go through long analyses."
The key military
planner was Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the I.D.F. chief of staff,
who, during a career in the Israeli Air Force, worked on contingency
planning for an air war with Iran. Olmert, a former mayor of Jerusalem,
and Peretz, a former labor leader, could not match his experience and
expertise.
In the early discussions
with American officials, I was told by the Middle East expert and the
government consultant, the Israelis repeatedly pointed to the war in
Kosovo as an example of what Israel would try to achieve. The NATO forces
commanded by U.S. Army General Wesley Clark methodically bombed and
strafed not only military targets but tunnels, bridges, and roads, in
Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia, for seventy-eight days before forcing
Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo. "Israel studied the Kosovo
war as its role model," the government consultant said. "The
Israelis told Condi Rice, 'You did it in about seventy days, but we
need half of that - thirty-five days.' "
There are, of course,
vast differences between Lebanon and Kosovo. Clark, who retired from
the military in 2000 and unsuccessfully ran as a Democrat for the Presidency
in 2004, took issue with the analogy: "If it's true that the Israeli
campaign is based on the American approach in Kosovo, then it missed
the point. Ours was to use force to obtain a diplomatic objective -
it was not about killing people." Clark noted in a 2001 book, "Waging
Modern War," that it was the threat of a possible ground invasion
as well as the bombing that forced the Serbs to end the war. He told
me, "In my experience, air campaigns have to be backed, ultimately,
by the will and capability to finish the job on the ground."
Kosovo has been
cited publicly by Israeli officials and journalists since the war began.
On August 6th, Prime Minister Olmert, responding to European condemnation
of the deaths of Lebanese civilians, said, "Where do they get the
right to preach to Israel? European countries attacked Kosovo and killed
ten thousand civilians. Ten thousand! And none of these countries had
to suffer before that from a single rocket. I'm not saying it was wrong
to intervene in Kosovo. But please: don't preach to us about the treatment
of civilians." (Human Rights Watch estimated the number of civilians
killed in the NATO bombing to be five hundred; the Yugoslav government
put the number between twelve hundred and five thousand.)
Cheney's office
supported the Israeli plan, as did Elliott Abrams, a deputy national-security
adviser, according to several former and current officials. (A spokesman
for the N.S.C. denied that Abrams had done so.) They believed that Israel
should move quickly in its air war against Hezbollah. A former intelligence
officer said, "We told Israel, 'Look, if you guys have to go, we're
behind you all the way. But we think it should be sooner rather than
later - the longer you wait, the less time we have to evaluate and plan
for Iran before Bush gets out of office.' "
Cheney's point,
the former senior intelligence official said, was "What if the
Israelis execute their part of this first, and it's really successful?
It'd be great. We can learn what to do in Iran by watching what the
Israelis do in Lebanon."
The Pentagon consultant
told me that intelligence about Hezbollah and Iran is being mishandled
by the White House the same way intelligence had been when, in 2002
and early 2003, the Administration was making the case that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction. "The big complaint now in the intelligence
community is that all of the important stuff is being sent directly
to the top - at the insistence of the White House - and not being analyzed
at all, or scarcely," he said. "It's an awful policy and violates
all of the N.S.A.'s strictures, and if you complain about it you're
out," he said. "Cheney had a strong hand in this."
The long-term Administration
goal was to help set up a Sunni Arab coalition - including countries
like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt - that would join the United States
and Europe to pressure the ruling Shiite mullahs in Iran. "But
the thought behind that plan was that Israel would defeat Hezbollah,
not lose to it," the consultant with close ties to Israel said.
Some officials in Cheney's office and at the N.S.C. had become convinced,
on the basis of private talks, that those nations would moderate their
public criticism of Israel and blame Hezbollah for creating the crisis
that led to war. Although they did so at first, they shifted their position
in the wake of public protests in their countries about the Israeli
bombing. The White House was clearly disappointed when, late last month,
Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, came to Washington
and, at a meeting with Bush, called for the President to intervene immediately
to end the war. The Washington Post reported that Washington had hoped
to enlist moderate Arab states "in an effort to pressure Syria
and Iran to rein in Hezbollah, but the Saudi move . . . seemed to cloud
that initiative."
The surprising
strength of Hezbollah's resistance, and its continuing ability to fire
rockets into northern Israel in the face of the constant Israeli bombing,
the Middle East expert told me, "is a massive setback for those
in the White House who want to use force in Iran. And those who argue
that the bombing will create internal dissent and revolt in Iran are
also set back."
Nonetheless, some
officers serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain deeply concerned
that the Administration will have a far more positive assessment of
the air campaign than they should, the former senior intelligence official
said. "There is no way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will draw the right
conclusion about this," he said. "When the smoke clears, they'll
say it was a success, and they'll draw reinforcement for their plan
to attack Iran."
In the White House,
especially in the Vice-President's office, many officials believe that
the military campaign against Hezbollah is working and should be carried
forward. At the same time, the government consultant said, some policymakers
in the Administration have concluded that the cost of the bombing to
Lebanese society is too high. "They are telling Israel that it's
time to wind down the attacks on infrastructure."
Similar divisions
are emerging in Israel. David Siegel, the Israeli spokesman, said that
his country's leadership believed, as of early August, that the air
war had been successful, and had destroyed more than seventy per cent
of Hezbollah's medium- and long-range-missile launching capacity. "The
problem is short-range missiles, without launchers, that can be shot
from civilian areas and homes," Siegel told me. "The only
way to resolve this is ground operations - which is why Israel would
be forced to expand ground operations if the latest round of diplomacy
doesn't work." Last week, however, there was evidence that the
Israeli government was troubled by the progress of the war. In an unusual
move, Major General Moshe Kaplinsky, Halutz's deputy, was put in charge
of the operation, supplanting Major General Udi Adam. The worry in Israel
is that Nasrallah might escalate the crisis by firing missiles at Tel
Aviv. "There is a big debate over how much damage Israel should
inflict to prevent it," the consultant said. "If Nasrallah
hits Tel Aviv, what should Israel do? Its goal is to deter more attacks
by telling Nasrallah that it will destroy his country if he doesn't
stop, and to remind the Arab world that Israel can set it back twenty
years. We're no longer playing by the same rules."
A European intelligence
officer told me, "The Israelis have been caught in a psychological
trap. In earlier years, they had the belief that they could solve their
problems with toughness. But now, with Islamic martyrdom, things have
changed, and they need different answers. How do you scare people who
love martyrdom?" The problem with trying to eliminate Hezbollah,
the intelligence officer said, is the group's ties to the Shiite population
in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut's southern suburbs,
where it operates schools, hospitals, a radio station, and various charities.
A high-level American
military planner told me, "We have a lot of vulnerability in the
region, and we've talked about some of the effects of an Iranian or
Hezbollah attack on the Saudi regime and on the oil infrastructure."
There is special concern inside the Pentagon, he added, about the oil-producing
nations north of the Strait of Hormuz. "We have to anticipate the
unintended consequences," he told me. "Will we be able to
absorb a barrel of oil at one hundred dollars? There is this almost
comical thinking that you can do it all from the air, even when you're
up against an irregular enemy with a dug-in capability. You're not going
to be successful unless you have a ground presence, but the political
leadership never considers the worst case. These guys only want to hear
the best case."
There is evidence
that the Iranians were expecting the war against Hezbollah. Vali Nasr,
an expert on Shiite Muslims and Iran, who is a fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations and also teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School,
in Monterey, California, said, "Every negative American move against
Hezbollah was seen by Iran as part of a larger campaign against it.
And Iran began to prepare for the showdown by supplying more sophisticated
weapons to Hezbollah - anti-ship and anti-tank missiles - and training
its fighters in their use. And now Hezbollah is testing Iran's new weapons.
Iran sees the Bush Administration as trying to marginalize its regional
role, so it fomented trouble."
Nasr, an Iranian-American
who recently published a study of the Sunni-Shiite divide, entitled
"The Shia Revival," also said that the Iranian leadership
believes that Washington's ultimate political goal is to get some international
force to act as a buffer - to physically separate Syria and Lebanon
in an effort to isolate and disarm Hezbollah, whose main supply route
is through Syria. "Military action cannot bring about the desired
political result," Nasr said. The popularity of Iran's President,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a virulent critic of Israel, is greatest in his
own country. If the U.S. were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, Nasr
said, "you may end up turning Ahmadinejad into another Nasrallah
- the rock star of the Arab street."
Donald Rumsfeld,
who is one of the Bush Administration's most outspoken, and powerful,
officials, has said very little publicly about the crisis in Lebanon.
His relative quiet, compared to his aggressive visibility in the run-up
to the Iraq war, has prompted a debate in Washington about where he
stands on the issue.
Some current and
former intelligence officials who were interviewed for this article
believe that Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and Cheney about the American
role in the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The U.S. government consultant
with close ties to Israel said that "there was a feeling that Rumsfeld
was jaded in his approach to the Israeli war." He added, "Air
power and the use of a few Special Forces had worked in Afghanistan,
and he tried to do it again in Iraq. It was the same idea, but it didn't
work. He thought that Hezbollah was too dug in and the Israeli attack
plan would not work, and the last thing he wanted was another war on
his shift that would put the American forces in Iraq in greater jeopardy."
A Western diplomat
said that he understood that Rumsfeld did not know all the intricacies
of the war plan. "He is angry and worried about his troops"
in Iraq, the diplomat said. Rumsfeld served in the White House during
the last year of the war in Vietnam, from which American troops withdrew
in 1975, "and he did not want to see something like this having
an impact in Iraq." Rumsfeld's concern, the diplomat added, was
that an expansion of the war into Iran could put the American troops
in Iraq at greater risk of attacks by pro-Iranian Shiite militias.
At a Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on August 3rd, Rumsfeld was less than enthusiastic
about the war's implications for the American troops in Iraq. Asked
whether the Administration was mindful of the war's impact on Iraq,
he testified that, in his meetings with Bush and Condoleezza Rice, "there
is a sensitivity to the desire to not have our country or our interests
or our forces put at greater risk as a result of what's taking place
between Israel and Hezbollah. . . . There are a variety of risks that
we face in that region, and it's a difficult and delicate situation."
The Pentagon consultant
dismissed talk of a split at the top of the Administration, however,
and said simply, "Rummy is on the team. He'd love to see Hezbollah
degraded, but he also is a voice for less bombing and more innovative
Israeli ground operations." The former senior intelligence official
similarly depicted Rumsfeld as being "delighted that Israel is
our stalking horse."
There are also
questions about the status of Condoleezza Rice. Her initial support
for the Israeli air war against Hezbollah has reportedly been tempered
by dismay at the effects of the attacks on Lebanon. The Pentagon consultant
said that in early August she began privately "agitating"
inside the Administration for permission to begin direct diplomatic
talks with Syria - so far, without much success. Last week, the Times
reported that Rice had directed an Embassy official in Damascus to meet
with the Syrian foreign minister, though the meeting apparently yielded
no results. The Times also reported that Rice viewed herself as "trying
to be not only a peacemaker abroad but also a mediator among contending
parties" within the Administration. The article pointed to a divide
between career diplomats in the State Department and "conservatives
in the government," including Cheney and Abrams, "who were
pushing for strong American support for Israel."
The Western diplomat
told me his embassy believes that Abrams has emerged as a key policymaker
on Iran, and on the current Hezbollah-Israeli crisis, and that Rice's
role has been relatively diminished. Rice did not want to make her most
recent diplomatic trip to the Middle East, the diplomat said. "She
only wanted to go if she thought there was a real chance to get a ceasefire."
Bush's strongest
supporter in Europe continues to be British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
but many in Blair's own Foreign Office, as a former diplomat said, believe
that he has "gone out on a particular limb on this" - especially
by accepting Bush's refusal to seek an immediate and total ceasefire
between Israel and Hezbollah. "Blair stands alone on this,"
the former diplomat said. "He knows he's a lame duck who's on the
way out, but he buys it" - the Bush policy. "He drinks the
White House Kool-Aid as much as anybody in Washington." The crisis
will really start at the end of August, the diplomat added, "when
the Iranians" - under a United Nations deadline to stop uranium
enrichment - "will say no."
Even those who
continue to support Israel's war against Hezbollah agree that it is
failing to achieve one of its main goals - to rally the Lebanese against
Hezbollah. "Strategic bombing has been a failed military concept
for ninety years, and yet air forces all over the world keep on doing
it," John Arquilla, a defense analyst at the Naval Postgraduate
School, told me. Arquilla has been campaigning for more than a decade,
with growing success, to change the way America fights terrorism. "The
warfare of today is not mass on mass," he said. "You have
to hunt like a network to defeat a network. Israel focussed on bombing
against Hezbollah, and, when that did not work, it became more aggressive
on the ground. The definition of insanity is continuing to do the same
thing and expecting a different result."
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